REMARKS:

Claims 1-43 are currently pending in the application.

Claims 11-26, 37-40 and 42 are withdrawn from consideration.

Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first

paragraph.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112:

Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first

paragraph, as allegedly failing to comply with the written description requirement. The

Applicant respectfully disagrees and respectfully traverses the Examiner's rejection of

Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 112.

The Applicant respectfully directs the Examiner's attention to MPEP 2163 which

provides guidelines for determining whether claims comply with the written description

requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. In particular, MPEP 2163(III)(A) provides

that the Examiner bears the initial burden of establishing that claims fail to comply with

the written description requirement:

A description as filed is *presumed to be adequate*, unless or until sufficient

evidence or reasoning to the contrary has been presented by the examiner to rebut the presumption. See, e.g., *In re Marzocchi*, 439 F.2d 220, 224, 169

USPQ 367, 370 (CCPA 1971). The examiner, therefore, must have a

reasonable basis to challenge the adequacy of the written description. The examiner has the initial burden of presenting by a preponderance of

evidence why a person skilled in the art would not recognize in an applicant's disclosure a description of the invention defined by the

claims. Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263, 191 USPQ at 97. (Emphasis added).

Thus, failure to comply with the written description requirement *must first be established*

by the Examiner, and the showing must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.

MPEP 2163(III)(A) then explains that a proper showing must include express findings

of fact that establish reasons why one skilled in the art would not have recognized that the inventor possessed the claimed invention:

In rejecting a claim, the examiner must set forth express findings of fact regarding the above analysis which support the lack of written description conclusion. These findings should:

(A) Identify the claim limitation at issue; and

(B) Establish a prima facie case by providing reasons why a person skilled in the art at the time the application was filed would not have recognized that the inventor was in possession of the invention as claimed in view of the disclosure of the application as filed. A general allegation of "unpredictability in the art" is not a sufficient reason to support a rejection for lack of adequate written description. (Emphasis added).

It should also be noted that the standard for compliance with the written description requirement involves the person of ordinary skill in the art, and what such a person would understand based on the written description:

The fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys with reasonable clarity *to those skilled in the art* that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. See, e.g., *Vas-Cath, Inc.*, 935 F.2d at 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d at 1117. MPEP 2163 (emphasis added).

As pointed out in MPEP 2163, "there is no in haec verba requirement."

Thus, the Examiner bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of failure to comply with the written description requirement, and in order to do so the Examiner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized from the written description that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention at the time the application was filed.

The Office Action has Failed to Properly Establish a *Prima Facie* case of Failure to Comply with the Written Description Requirement

The Applicant respectfully submits that the Office Action has failed to properly

establish a prima facie case of failure to comply with the written description requirement.

The Office Action has not shown by a preponderance of evidence, let alone any

evidence, why a person skilled in the art would not recognize the description of the

invention as defined by the claims, of the subject Application. The Office Action merely

states that these "claims contain subject matter which was not described in the

specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that

to duplicate this invention without trial and error." (30 May 2006 Office Action, Page

2). (Emphasis Added). The Applicant respectfully disagrees.

The Applicant respectfully submits that the Examiner has mischaracterized the

determination of whether claims comply with the written description requirement of 35

U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. For example, the Applicant directs the Examiner's attention

to 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,

and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and

use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the

inventor of carrying out his invention. (Emphasis Added).

The Applicant respectfully requests the Examiner to cite a specific rule in 37 C.F.R.

or in the MPEP that specifically states that a claim must "contain subject matter" that is

described in the specification "to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that

to duplicate this invention without trial and error."

Furthermore, the Examiner asserts that "Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 are

rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because: they are essentially directed to a

software imbedded [sic] in a computer-readable media and using in a system - even

pending claims are directed to 'system' because incorporating that specific software (a

MUST) can be considered as a brain of this invention (while the submitted specification

provides nothing to enable one with ordinary skill in the art to practice - non enablement);

and the specification does not reasonably provide enablement of a claimed software for

use in a claimed system." (30 May 2006 Office Action, Page 2). (Emphasis Original). The Applicant respectfully disagrees and further respectfully request clarification as to what the Examiner is referring to or even how this relates to the subject Application.

The Applicant respectfully submits that the Examiner has failed to provide a proper showing of any express findings of fact which supports the alleged lack of written description. For example, how does "the specification does not reasonably provide enablement of a claimed software for use in a claimed system" directly identify the claim limitation at issue, as required by MPEP 2163(III)(A). (30 May 2006 Office Action, Page 2). (Emphasis Added). In another example, how does "because: they are essentially directed to a software imbedded [sic] in a computer-readable media and using in a system" provide any reason why a person skilled in the art at the time the application was filed would not have recognized that the inventor was in possession of the invention as claimed in view of the disclosure of the application as filed, as required by MPEP 2163(III)(A). (30 May 2006 Office Action, Page 2). (Emphasis Added). In yet another example, what "pending claims" is the Examiner referring to and to what extent does the Examiner purport that "(a MUST) can be considered as a brain of this invention" applies to the subject Application. (30 May 2006 Office Action, Page 2). (Emphasis Added).

The Examiner further asserts that the "[A]pplicant only provides a very high level drawing (i.e. Fig. 5), not the essential codes and instructions – the subject matter of this invention – to make this invention." (30 May 2006 Office Action, Pages 2-3). (Emphasis Added). The Applicant respectfully disagrees and further respectfully requests the Examiner to cite a specific rule in 37 C.F.R. or in the MPEP that specifically requires the Applicant to provide "essential codes and instructions" in order to comply with the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

The Applicant respectfully submits that the Examiner's initial burden of presenting by a preponderance of evidence has not been met in the Office Action mailed on 30 May 2006. The Applicant further respectfully submits that the Examiner's conclusory statements in the present Office Action are merely a general allegation and are

not a sufficient reason to support a rejection for lack of adequate written description. In

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addition, since the Office Action fails to provide any of the requisite analysis for

supporting this rejection, it is respectfully submitted that the rejection is improper

and should be withdrawn. The Examiner may call the undersigned, Steven J. Laureanti,

at (817) 447-9955 if the Examiner believes that it would be easier to discuss the 35 U.S.C.

§ 112 rejection over the phone.

The Applicant's Claims are in Full Compliance with the Requirements of 35 U.S.C. §

112, First Paragraph

The Applicant respectfully submits that independent Claims 1, 27, 41, and 43 are

considered to be in full compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The

Applicant further respectfully submits that independent Claims 1, 27, 41, and 43 are in

condition for allowance.

With respect to dependent Claims 2-10 and 28-36: claims 2-10 depend from

independent Claim 1 and Claims 28-36 depend from independent Claim 27. As

mentioned above, each of independent Claims 1, 27, 41 and 43 are considered to be in

full compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Thus, dependent Claims 2-10

and 28-36 are considered to be in condition for allowance for at least the reason of

depending from an allowable claim.

For at least the reasons set forth herein, the Applicant respectfully submits that

Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 are considered to be in full compliance with the

requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The Applicant further respectfully submits that Claims 1-

10, 27-36, 41, and 43 are in condition for allowance. Thus, the Applicant respectfully

requests that the rejection of Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 be

reconsidered and that Claims 1-10, 27-36, 41, and 43 be allowed.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103:

The Applicant thanks the Examiner for withdrawing the rejection of: Claims 1, 5, 27,

31, 41, and 43 over U.S. Patent No. 6,708,161 to Tenorio et al. ("Tenorio") in view of U.S.

Response to Office Action Attorney Docket No. 020431.0839 Serial No. 09/858,322 Patent No. 6,366,910 to Rajaraman et al. ("*Rajaraman*"); Claims 2, 7-10, 28, and 33-36 over *Tenorio* in view of *Rajaraman* in further view of U.S. Patent No. 6,078,891 to Riordan et al. ("*Riordan*") and in further view of U.S. Patent No. 6,578,014 to Murcko Jr. ("*Murcko*"); and Claims 3, 4, 6, 29, 30, and 32 over *Tenorio* in view of *Rajaraman* and in further view of *Murcko*.

CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, this application is considered to be in condition for allowance, and early reconsideration and a Notice of Allowance are earnestly solicited.

Although Applicant believe no fees are deemed to be necessary; the undersigned hereby authorizes the Director to charge any additional fees which may be required, or credit any overpayments, to **Deposit Account No. 500777**.

Please link this application to Customer No. 53184 so that its status may be checked via the PAIR System.

Respectfully submitted,

8/15/06

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CUSTOMER NO. 53184

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